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Abstract: Social communities have drawn a lot of attention in the past
decades. We have previously introduced and validated the use of the cohesion,
a graph metric which quantitatively captures the community-ness in a social
sense of a set of nodes in a graph. Here we show that the problem of maximizing
this quantity is NP-Hard. Furthermore, we show that the dual problem of
minimizing this quantity, for a xed set size is also NP-Hard. We then propose
a heuristic to optimize the cohesion which we apply to the graph of voting
agreement between U.S Senators. Finally we conclude on the validity of the
approach by analyzing the resulting agreement communities.
Key-words: graph theory, community detection, np-completeness, cohesion,
complexity, social network analysis
Trouver des communautes cohesives avec C3
Resume : Les communautes sociales ont attire beaucoup d'attention ces
dernieres annees. Nous avions precedemment propose et valide l'utilisation de
la cohesion, une metrique de graphe qui capture quantitativement la qualite
communautaire, au sens social, d'un ensemble de sommets d'un graphe. Nous
montrons que le probleme de trouver un ensemble de cohesion maximum dans
un graphe non oriente est NP-dur. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que le probleme
dual de minimiser cette quantite, pour une taille donnee, est aussi NP-dur.
Nous proposons ensuite une heuristique pour optimiser la cohesion que nous
appliquons au graph d'agrement de vote entre Senateurs des Etats-Unis. Finalement
nous concluons sur la validite de l'approche en analysant les communautes
resultantes.
Mots-cles : theory des graphes, detection de communautes, np-completude,
cohesion, complexite, analyse de reseaux sociaux
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In [1], we have introduced a new metric called the cohesion which rates the
communityness of a group of people in a social network from a sociological
point of view. The idea behind the cohesion is, rather than looking at the
proportion of edges falling inside and in between communities, to take into
account the triads in the network and dene a community as a subgraph having
a high transitivity and featuring a low number of triangles going outwards to
the rest of the network. Through a large scale experiment on Facebook, we
have established that the cohesion is highly correlated to the subjective user
perception of the communities.
In this article, we show that nding a set of vertices with maximum cohesion
is NP-hard. We will then also establish that the dual problem of nding the
less cohesive groups of a graph is NP-hard. Then we shall introduce C3, a
heuristic which covers a given graph with cohesive communities by pseudo-
greedily expanding around selected edges.
Finally we shall validate this heuristic by studying the communities it yields
on the agreement graph of U.S. Senators on which we shall be able to demon-
strate that the communities which are obtained independently for each Congress
Session are stable through time and can be identied with political parties.
Notations Let G = (V;E) be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E of
size n = jV j  4. For all vertices u 2 V , we write dG(u) the degree of u, or more
simply d(u)1 and N (S) the set of neighbors of S. A triangle in G is a triplet of
pairwise connected vertices. For all sets of vertices S  V , let G[S] = (S;ES)
be the subgraph induced by S on G. We write m(S) = jES j the number of
edges in G[S], and . (S) = jf(u; v; w) 2 S3 : (uv; vw; uw) 2 E3Sgj the number
of triangles in G[S]. We dene . (S) = jf(u; v; w); (u; v) 2 S2; w 2 V n S :
(uv; vw; uw) 2 E3gj, the number of outbound triangles of S, that is: triangles
in G which have exactly two vertices in S. Finally, we recall the denition of
the cohesion.
C(S) =
. (S)2 jSj
3

( . (S) + . (S))
The cohesion is a measure of the community-ness of a set of nodes and is a
compromise between a large density of triangles inside the community and the
amount of triangles pointing outwards from the community.
1 Complexity
1.1 Max-Cohesion is NP-hard
In this section we examine the problem of nding a set of vertices S  V (G)
of maximum cohesion in a graph G, i.e. for all subset S0  V , C(S0)  C(S).
We shall rst show that the set of vertices with maximum cohesion in a given
network is connected, per Theorem 1.2.
1Here, as elsewhere, we drop the index referring to the underlying graph if the reference is
clear.
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Lemma 1.1 Let S1; S2  V (G) be two disconnected sets of vertices ((S1S2)\
E(G) = ;). Then C(S1)  C(S1 [S2)) C(S2) > C(S1 [S2). The proof is given
in A.1.
Theorem 1.2 Let S be a non-connected set of vertices of G. Then there exists
a connected set S0  S having a higher cohesion C(S0) > C(S).
Proof Let S1; S2  V (G) such that S1 [ S2 = V (G) and S1, S2 disconnected,
then at least one of S1 or S2 has a higher cohesion than S per Lemma 1.1. If
the set with higher cohesion is connected, the result is immediate. If not, the
same reasoning applies to that set, which leads to the conclusion. 
Therefore the problem at hand is equivalent to that of nding a connected
set of vertices with maximum cohesion in G. The decision problem associated
to the latter is Connected-Cohesive.
Input A graph G = (V;E),  2 Q,  2 [0; 1]
Question Is there a subset connected S of V such that C(S)  ?
We shall now proceed to show that Connected-Cohesive is NP-complete.
First note that given a set S of vertices of G, it is possible to verify that S is
a solution of Connected-Cohesive by computing its cohesion, its size, its
connectivity and the minimum degree of its vertices, all in polynomial time.
Therefore Connected-Cohesive is in NP. We shall now reduce Clique to
Connected-Cohesive. We recall that Clique is:
Input A graph G = (V;E), k 2 N; k  jV j
Question Is there a subset S of V such that jSj = k and the subgraph induced
by S is a clique?
Let (G = (V;E); k 2 N) be an instance of Clique2. We can assume that G is
connected (if not, we use the following reasoning separately on each connected
component of G). We construct an instance (G0 = (V 0; E0); ) of Connected-
Cohesive by adding an edge between all non connected vertices u and v in G
and then linking those two vertices to all vertices in a clique of size 2
 
n
3
4
which
we add to the network, as described in Algorithm B.1 and illustrated by Figure 1.
Theorem 1.3 There exists a clique of size k in G if and only if there exists a
connected group of vertices of G0 with cohesion   (
k
3)
(k3)+(
k
2)(n k)
. The proof is
given in A.2.
Theorem 1.4 Connected-Cohesive is NP-complete.
Proof. Per Theorem 1.3, there exists a clique of size k in G if and only if
there exists a connected subset of vertices of G0 of cohesion   (
k
3)
(k3)+(
k
2)(n k)
and
2We consider here that jGj > 2 and k > 2, although this is not exactly Clique, this
problem is clearly NP-complete.
INRIA
Finding cohesive communities with C3 5
the transformation from G; k to G0;  runs in polynomial time. Thus Clique is
reducible to Connected-Cohesive and the problem is NP-hard. Given that
it is in NP, the problem is thus NP-complete.
The associated decision problem being NP-complete, the problem of nding
a set of vertices with maximum cohesion is NP-hard. Note that the problem
of nding a set of vertices of maximum cohesion containing a set of predened
vertices is also NP-hard, by an immediate reduction.
1.2 k-Min-Cohesion is NP-hard
Dual to the problem of nding a subset with maximum cohesion is that of min-
imizing the cohesion, which can be useful when trying to identify socially weak
subgraphs in highly cohesive networks. We formulate the k-Min-Cohesion
problem in the following way:
Input A graph G = (V;E)
Output A subset S  V such that jSj = k and 8S0  V , C(S)  C(S0)
In order to prove that k-Min-Cohesion is NP-hard, we will show that the
problem of nding a set of nodes of size k with cohesion 0 is NP-complete. First
note that one can check in polynomial time that a set of nodes has cohesion 0,
thus the problem is in NP. Now notice that if a set of nodes has cohesion 0,
then in particular . (S) = 0, which means that S does not contain any triangles.
Conversely, if . (S) = 0 then C(S) = 0, therefore nding a set S of size k such
that C(S) = 0 is equivalent to the problem of nding a triangle free induced
subgraph of size k. The property of being triangle free is hereditary: all sub-
graphs of a triangle-free subgraph is itself triangle free, and is non trivial: there
are innitely many triangle free subgraphs, therefore the problem of nding a
triangle free induced subgraph is NP-complete [2].
2 The C3 heuristic
In this section we introduce a heuristic algorithm, C3 which operates in three
step: Cover, Communitize and Combine. C3 covers a network (Cover) with
overlapping communities in a network by greedily maximizing their cohesion
(Communitize), and merges communities which overlap two much (Combine).
2.1 Communitize around a node
We present an algorithm specially tailored for the problem of maximizing the
cohesion. Suppose that we have a set of nodes S and we wish to add nodes to
S in order to potentially nd a new set S0  S such that C(S0)  C(S). The
greedy approach is to start by adding to S a node which increases it cohesion.
Another solution is to also explore the possibility that adding a node which
increases the transitivity of the subgraph might lead to a higher cohesion in the
RR n° 7947
6 Adrien Friggeri , Eric Fleury
end, if this turns out not to be as successful as hoped, then we can always revert
back to S and try with another unvisited node.
We shall say that u is a candidate for S if it follows the constraints which
are detailed in Algorithm B.2. First the node should be a neighbor of our seed
group because of the connectivity of the community with maximal cohesion and
we then verify that the node has not already been added to the community.
Next, a node is a candidate if we increase the number of outbound triangles of
a group without triangles (adding this type of nodes allows us to go deeper into
the \heart" of the communities). In all other cases we forbid nodes who do not
create any triangles inside the community. The main reason the two previous
constraints are added is to be able to deal with the cases where jSj  3, in which
case S does not contain any triangle and we need to bootstrap a beginning
of community. Finally, we mark as candidates the nodes which increase the
cohesion and the transitivity.
The next task is to discriminate which of those nodes is the best possible
candidate. Given a set of nodes S and its candidates K, we select the node
u with the highest C (S [ fug). If all have identical value, we will then select
the one which has the highest
. (S[fug)
jSj+1 . In case all nodes have still the same
values, we shall discriminate using the highest . (S [ fug)  . (S). Finally, in
last resort, we will pick the node with the highest degree. These two last criteria
are here to help bootsrap the community in the rst rounds of the algorithm.
We dene the Communitize algorithm (Alg. B.3) recursively as follows,
given a graph G and a set of nodes S we rst establish the list K of nodes of
G which are candidates in respect to S. Then, for each node u of K, chosen as
previously mentioned, if we have not already visited that node, we compute the
best community containing S [fug. Finally, we return the community with the
highest cohesion in the set fSg [Su2K communitize(S [ fug).
Computing the cohesion of a set of nodes has a non negligeable cost, as it
is done in O(jS [N (S)j3). It is however not mandatory to recompute at each
step the cohesion, as we can just track the variations induced by the addition
or deletion of a node by keeping count of the number of inbound and outbound
triangles and for each node u, the number of inbound (resp. outbound) triangles
.
u (resp.
.
u) which would be added if u was added to S. We can then write
an updateSet function which adds or delete a node u to S and maintains the
correct values of . and . . Let  = 1 when u is added and  =  1 when u
is deleted. If the list of neighbors N (u) are sorted it is possible to bring the
complexity of the update down to O(Pv2N (u) d(u) + d(v)).
By modifying the Communitize algorithm in order to create a commu-
nity which is then modied in place using setUpdate, we obtain an algorithm
which optimizes the cohesion by recursively adding sound candidates to an ini-
tial seed and always returns the most cohesive group it encounters. The com-
plexity of adding or deleting a node stems from the update step which cost is
O(Pv2N (u) d(u) + d(v)). Each node is added and deleted from the community
at most once, which leads to an overall worst case complexity complexity of
O (jV j jEj).
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2.2 Cover a set of nodes
Although Communitize allows us to expand around a set of nodes in order to
obtain a more highly cohesive set of nodes, it is not always desirable to obtain
one and only one community. We introduce a second algorithm (Alg. B.5),
which uses Communitize to expand around carefully selected nodes of the
network. The basic idea is to choose one node u in S, nd the best community
containing u and one of its neighbors, mark all the nodes in that community as
covered and repeat as long as there are nodes which are not covered. We choose
to iterate over S by increasing degree as placing low degree nodes rst into
their communities allows us to more precisely capture the community structure
around nodes with a higher degree. The reason why we choose to expand
around u and one of its neighbors is that if we only expanded around u some
communities would not be detected. Consider for example the four triangles
depicted in Figure 2, the algorithm ignore the presence of the middle clique
which nodes would have already been covered.
Finally, we have presented in this section an algorithm which places each
node of a given set in at least one cohesive community. Alghough the resulting
algorithm has a worst case complexity bounded O

jV j jEj2

, this would be
the case when each edge lead to a community containing all the graph without
covering any other edge, which is impossible.
2.3 Combine similar groups
We now present the last pillar of C3, which allows to parametrically control the
amount of overlap which is authorized. Let us consider a graph G. After running
Cover we obtain a collection of communities (Si)0ik. Suppose that we are
provided with a function Ov which rate at which extent two communities Si and
Sj overlap. Furthermore, suppose that we dispose of a maximum authorized
overlap omax. We construct a weighted graph   where each node ui corresponds
to a community Si, and where there are edges between two nodes ui and uj if
and only if Ov(Si; Sj)  omax, the weight of the edge being Ov(Si; Sj). Once the
communities are laid out this way, the problem of nding sets of communities
which overlap suciently reduces to a problem of \community" detection in the
meta-graph.
However, contrary to the graphs we have encountered until now,   is a
weighted graph, therefore we have to adapt the denition of the cohesion in order
to be able to recursively use C3 to nd the meta-communities. There are several
ways the denition of the cohesion can be extended to take into account graphs
where edges have weights in [0; 1]. Basically, it suces to produce a function
which allows to transfer the notion of weights from the edges uv; uw; vw to the
triangle uvw. On can use the product of the edges which is intuitive, however
when judging the overlap contained inside a triangle, it might be useful to use
the maximum of the product of two of the three edges, which adds transitivity
to the overlap function. Using such weights on triangles, the denition of the
weighted cohesion comes immediately, in the weighted version, . is the sum
RR n° 7947
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of the weights of inbound triangles and . becomes the sum of the weights of
outbound triangles.
We can then compute the communities of   by using Cover and recursively
calling Combine on the result. Then, for each meta-community , three cases
are possible, either jj = 1 and the community in  is not aected, either jj = 2
and the two communities S1; S2 in  are merged, or jj  3, the communities
in  are merged if the cohesion of  is higher than a certain treshold C0. This
algorithm always nishes, given that for a graph of size n Cover gives at most
n  3 communities.
3 Application of C3 to the U.S. Senate
The United States Senate is the upper house of the United States legislature.
Originally, Senators were elected by the individual state legislatures, but have
been elected by the people since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in
1913. Contrary to the House of Representative which seats are up for election
every two years, Senators serve terms of six years each. Those terms are however
staggered so that approximately one-third of the Senate is renewed every two
years. This period of two years is called a United State Congress.
Contrary to other countries, data concerning elected ocials and the activ-
ity of the houses is openly available in the United States. We have used the
GovTrack website which provides both a list of all elected ocials and votes
both at the Senate and the Congress to construct graphs of agreement. Each
Senator usually serves, except for unfortunate events, in at least three consecu-
tive Congresses. Therefore we have decided to focus on the Senate as there is a
continuity in those serving, which allows to observe more precisely the evolution
of political groups.
For each of the 112 Congresses we shall construct an agreement graph Gi =
(Vi; Ei) where Vi is the set of the Senators active during the i
th Congress. Due
to some ambiguity in the data, we could not restrict ourselve to the Senators
and actually construct the graph of those who have casted at least one vote in
Senate, nevertheless, we shall qualify our actors of Senators, for clarity's sake.
All votes we have encountered were choices between two options which we shall
arbitrarily denote A and B, therefore each Senator had either voted A, or B or
did not vote.
For each Congress i we associate to the Senator s a vote vector V i;s of
dimension the number of votes which have taken place during that Congress,
such that V i;sk = 1 if s voted A for the k
th vote, V i;sk = 0 if s did not vote for the
kth vote and V i;sk =  1 if s voted B for the kth vote. We can then compute the
agreement (or weight) between two Senators as the cosine similarity between
their votes Wi(s1; s2) =
V i;s1 V i;s2
kV i;s1kkV i;s2k Given those agreement weights, we can
now construct the edges of the agreement graph Gi, we add an edge of weight
Wi(s1; s2) between s1 and s2 if Wi(s1; s2) 6= 0.
The cumulative distribution of those weights are given, as an example, on
Figure 3. It is notable that in all cases more than 50% of the edges have a
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positive value. We can observe that the earlier Senates presented a certain
balance in the distribution of the edges: there was a similar number of edges
of positive and negative weights. More recent Senates have a bias towards
agreement, as exemplied by the latest Senate (112th Congress (2011{2013))
where 75% of edges have a positive weight and 45% of edges have a value greater
than 0:5. This trend is explicit when we observe the evolution of the average
value of agreement (Fig. 4). The rst thing to notice is that the average value
is always greater than 0, which indicates that although being from dierent
political horizons Senators tend to agree more with each other than to disagree.
There are however variations in the evolution of the average agreement.
During the rst few Congresses, the average agreement increases in a context
where the United States are a young nation. There is however a sudden drop in
agreement during the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses, which took place just
before and during the war of 1812, the rst major conict between the United
States and the British Empire since the end of the American Revolutionary War
in 1783. During the Fifteenth Congress (1817{1819), the average agreement
rises to more than 0:2. Coincidentally, in 1819, the United States faced the so-
called \Panic of 1819", its rst major nancial crisis. It then steadily decreases,
attaigning its minimum during the 27th Congress (1841{1843), in the years of
instability leading of the Civil War and then decreasing in average throught
the Reconstruction era. It is only with what Mark Twain dubbed the \Gilded
Age" that the average agreement increases again, around the time of the 51st
Congress (1889{1891). The next major increase occurs around the 83rd Congress
(1953{1955). In 1953, major political changes occur both in the United States
and the USSR which shifted the dynamic of the cold war. At the same time,
Joseph McCarthy started its communist witch hunt while heading the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The Cuban Missile Crisis occured
during the 87th Congress (1961{1963) which marked a temporary decrease in
agreement, although the average increase would then continue until the 102nd
Congress (1991{1993). In the past two decades, the agreement has swinged up
and down, staying on average higher than 0.18. Notice how it has attained it
has peaked at its maximum during the 107th Congress (2001{2003), which was
marked by the 9/11 attacks.
4 Signed & Weighted Cohesion
The graphs Gi that we have obtained in the previous section have weights which
vary between 1 and 1, therefore we need to extend the denition of the cohesion
in order to take those negative edges into account. If an edge uv has a negative
weight, it means that u and v are in disagreement and should not be added to
a same community.
In terms of triangle, the consequence is that if a triangle contains at least a
negative edge, then it should contribute negatively to the cohesion. We therefore
introduce a the sgn(uvw) function which gives us the sign of the contribution of
a triangle, that is sgn(uvw) =  1 if W (uv) < 0 or W (uw) < 0 of W (vw) < 0,
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and 0 in all other cases. From there we can dene the signed weight of a
triangle Ws(uvw) = sgn(uvw)W (uvw), where W (uvw) can be any unsigned
triangle weighing function. Here we shall choose to use the product of the edges
weights, W (uvw) =W (uv)W (uw)W (vw).
Let us now extend the cohesion in order to take into account the signed
weights of triangles and at the same time remain compatible with its unsigned
version. If a group has negative . and positive . , it means that there is
more disagreement inside the group than towards the rest of the network, and
therefore the cohesion should be low. For similar reasons, if . if positive and
. is negative, the group has a high agreement with itself and is opposed to the
rest of the network, which should result into a high cohesion. Intuitively, if .
and . are of opposite signs, the group is isolated from the rest of the network
and the cohesion is reduced to the transitivity. Finally, there is the case when
both . and . are negative. In that case the expression of the isolation factor
and thus that of the cohesion remain the same. The formulas for the signed and
weighted cohesion are given in Table.1. This new denition of the cohesion can
be used directly in C3 without adapting the algorithm.
5 Of History, Dynamics and Stability
For each Congress we have computed using C3 the communities of its agreement
graph using the extended cohesion. On Figure 5 we present the evolution of the
number of communities of agreement through time.
The rst thing to notice is that, except in three cases, there are between
one and three communities. The First Congress (1789{1791) has 10 dierent
communities and the Second Congress (1791{1793) as well as the 37th Congress
(1861{1863) has 5 communities. Notably, the latter coincides with the beginning
of the American Civil war in 1861 and the larger number of communities reects
the political turmoil at the time. About the two rst Congresses, one has to bear
in mind that there were no national political parties prior to the Presidential
Election of 1796. The United States were a young nation and did not have
a two-party system. It is important to note that that era is more an era of
faction rather than parties, and thus alliances would shift at a fast pace in this
early era of U.S. political history, which is visible when looking at the number of
communities during the four rst Congresses. By the start of the Fifth Congress,
two national political parties had emerged from the two aforementioned factions.
From there on, the United States have had a two-party system, which is visible
in the number of communities in the agreement graph which except the three
previously mentioned exceptions vary between 2 and 3. Furthermore, since the
84th Congress (1955{1957), there was no more than two communities { and there
were ve occurences where there was only one community. This diminution in
the number of communities is a direct consequence of the previously mentioned
increase in agreement among Senators.
Concerning the dynamics of those graph, as we have said earlier, at each
Congress, only a third of the Senate seats are up for election. On Figure 6,
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we have plotted the proportion of the members of the Senate during a given
Congress which remained in position during the following Congress. This con-
tinuity Ci is expressed as Ci =
jVi\Vi+1j
jVij . As we expected, there is a high
continuity, in most cases larger than 2=3 { the cases where it is lower can be
explained by the passing of some Senators or other unfortunate events. It is
also interesting to notice that this score tends to increase as time passes.
We have represented on Figure 7 the cumulative distribution of the number
of terms served by each Senator. More than a third of all Senators have served
more than ve terms and almost half of the Senators have served at least three
terms. Contrast this with the fact that a U.S. President cannot be elected for
more than two terms since the passage of the Twenty-second amendment. The
notion that there should be a term limit in Congress was brought forth by the
Republican Party in the 1990s but the proposal fell through in the House.
We shall now quantify the evolution of the communities in two dierent ways.
First, similar to the way we have dened continuity for the whole Senates, we
shall dene a metric of continuity between to communities of two consecutive
Congresses. Let us consider the communities (Si;j) and (Si+1;j) of the i
th and
i + 1th Congresses. We shall dene then continuity between two communities
Si;j and Si+1;k as c(Si;j ; Si+1;k) =
jSi;j\Si+1;kj
jSi;j\Sl Si+1;lj . That is, the ratio of Senators
present in both groups compared to those present in the oldest one and which
are also active in the second Congress. The idea is to compare the dispersion of
the Senators present in a given group, this is why we restrict ourselves to those
who are present in both Congresses i and i + 1. For each community S1, we
shall say that is successor is the community S2 for which c(S1; S2) is maximal.
Figure 8 displays the cumulative distribution of community continuities between
each group and its successor. It is particularly notable that in more than 90%
of cases, half of the members present in a community are also present in its
successor { once again, only counting those present in both sessions.
Another way of looking at this question is at the level of the Senators them-
selves. We shall say that two Senators are co-present to a certain degree if they
belong to at least one same community. Let u and v be two senators, we dene
their co-presence as the number of times they appear in the same community
divided by the number of times they are active in a same Congress. Given that
a Senator might be in several dierent communities, we shall count one presence
for each community, and thus a Senator can be virtually present more than once
during one given Congress. More formally, let (Si;j) be the set of communities
for the graph Gi, we write Tu;v the number of times u and v appear in a same
community. We similarly dene Su;v, the number of times u and v appear in the
same session. We can then write the co-presence of u and v as: P (u; v) =
Tu;v
Su;v
Figure 9 represents the cumulative distribution of the value of the co-presence
for a selected subset of pairs of Senators. We have voluntarily excluded the pairs
who never appear in the same Congress, that is Su;v = 0 as it would make no
sense to compare their communities. Next, we have also removed the pairs
which are never in the same community (Tu;v = 0), as their inclusion bring
no information on the stability of the communities. Finally we have chosen
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to exclude the pairs who only appear in one Congress and belong to the same
community (Tu;v = Su;v = 1), although their inclusion would articially increase
the cumulative distribution we believe it would provide no insight on the actual
dynamic aspects of communities given that the information is only extracted
from one same timeslice. Their remains the pairs of Senators who appear in
at least two Congresses and who are at least once in the same community. We
observe that more than 30% of pairs of Senators are stable through time in
respect to their communities, that is to say that they have a co-presence of 1
and therefore always appear together in the same community. Moreover, 75%
of the pairs have a co-presence greater than 0:5, meaning that 75% of pairs
of senators who appear together in at least one community are in the same
community in the majority of the Congresses they are active in.
We have described the evolution of the number of communities of the agree-
ment graphs through time, which we explained by refering to the history of the
United States Political system and we have exhibited the continuity in Senate
membership between Congresses. We have then shown that the communities
which were found using C3 present a certain stability, as they present a high
continuity and that Senators appearing together in one community tend to be
in the same communities during other Congresses. It is most notable to observe
this kind of stability given that the data analysis done on each graph was made
independently from the other graphs, which leads us to validate the use of C3
to compute the communities of agreement.
6 The Blurry Line Between Parties
Until now, we have justied the number of communities by refering to political
parties. Fortunately, we have access to the political aliation of each Senator
in our graph which means we can validate that intuition. We shall say that a
party is dominant in a community if it has the largest representation, and we
shall call the domination ratio of a community the quotient of the number of
members of the dominant party in the community divided by the size of the
community. On Figure 10 we have represented, for each session, the average of
the domination ratio over all communities. The majority of communities have
an average domination ratio of 70%, which means that in most cases one can
identify the community to the political party.
In particular, let us look more precisely at a subset of the data, ranging from
the 105th Congress (1997{1999) to the 112th Congress (2011{2013). The sizes
of the communities as well as the number members of each party represented
in the community are given in Table. 2 and a visual representation of those
communities are given in Figure 11. First notice that although the communities
are allowed to overlap, there are only ve cases where we witness an overlap,
three of which being because one individual is part of the two communities, one
because seven are shared between the two groups of the 111th Congress (2009{
2011) and the largest overlap is attained during the 108th Congress (2003{2005)
where 10 Senators are part of both communities.
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As stated before, each of those communities has a clearly dominant party,
be it the Democrat Party or the Republican Party. It is however interesting to
observe three things. First, even though the communities have a large majority
belonging to a same party, there are members of the other party which are
more in agreement with there opponents than their political family, and this
even in cases where there is no overlap between communities. For example,
in the 106th and 107th Congresses, the democrat which is in the Republican
community is Zell Miller, who has frequently criticized the Democratic Party
since 2003, backed the Republican President over the Democratic nominee in the
2004 presidential election, has publicly supported several Republican candidates
and serves as the national co-chair to the campaign of Republican presidential
candidate Newt Gingrich.
During the 108th Congress (2003{2005) there is a large ovelap between the
two communities, leading to the presence of 18 Democrats in the Republican
agreement community. We have found no satisfactory explanation to this ob-
servation. The rst line we pursued while trying to understand that result is
that the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, but it turns out that more than
half of those 18 Democrat Senators were vocally opposed to the use of force to
overthrow the Iraqi government and thus would have no reason whatsoever to
vote in agreement with the Republicans on those texts. Furthermore, we have
found no trace of any particular event which might explain this result and thus
the question of what happened in 2003{2004 in the Senate remains open.
Finally, there are some Congresses where there is a large number of Republi-
cans in the otherwise Democrat dominated comunity. For example, in the 110th
Congress (2007{2009) there are 11 Republicans which are more in the Democrat
community of agreement. A list of facts about 8 of those Senators is given in
Appendix E in order to explain their presence in a Democrat community.
We have observed that, although most communities are largely dominated
by a party, there are some cases where Senators from other parties are present.
By looking into the political prole of those seemingly displaced individuals, we
have explain their placement by a disalignment between the Senators and their
ocial aliation. Note that in some cases we were however unable to nd a
plausible explanation, such as for example as to why 18 Democrats have been
grouped into the Republican community in the 108th Congress. This adds to
the validation of C3 to compute community of agreement, given that no party
information had been used to calculate the communities.
Conclusion
In this article we have rst proved that the problem of nding communities with
maximal cohesion is an NP-hard problem. We have then also proven that the
dual problem of minimizing the cohesion at a xed size is alsoNP-hard. In order
to compute social communities we have presented a heuristic, C3, which covers
a graph by expanding around selected edges and then combines communities
depending on an overlap parameter.
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Finally, we have applied this heuristic to an agreement graph of U.S. Senators
votes in which we have observed that the communities found by C3 are relatively
stable through time despite being computed independently from one graph to
the other. We have also shown that the communities can be assimilated to
their dominant political party and found an explanation as to the presence of
members of one party in a community dominated by another one.
We had previously shown that the cohesion was a good indicator of subjective
perception of communities and the two last results lead us to believe that,
although being a heuristic, C3 yields communities which make sense from a
social standpoint.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
By contradiction, suppose that C(S1)  C(S1 [ S2) and C(S2)  C(S1 [ S2),
which we can rewrite as:
. (S1)
2 jS1j
3
   . (S1) + . (S1) C(S1 [ S2) (1)
. (S2)
2 jS2j
3
   . (S2) + . (S2) C(S1 [ S2) (2)
By summing (1) and (2) it comes that:
. (S1)
2 jS1j
3
 + . (S2)2 jS2j
3
   . (S1) + . (S1) + . (S2) + . (S2) C(S1 [ S2)
Now, given that S1 and S2 are disconnected, we have:
. (S1) + . (S2) = . (S1 [ S2)
. (S1) +
. (S2) =
. (S1 [ S2)
Therefore,
. (S1)
2 jS1j
3
 + . (S2)2 jS2j
3
   . (S1 [ S2) + . (S1 [ S2) C(S1 [ S2)
 (
. (S1) + . (S2))
2 jS1j+jS2j
3

Furthermore, given that jS1j ; jS2j > 1, the following holds:jS1j
3

+
jS2j
3

<
jS1j+ jS2j
3

From there it comes:
. (S1)
2 jS1j
3
 + . (S2)2 jS2j
3
 < ( . (S1) + . (S2))2 jS1j
3

+
 jS2j
3

Which simplies to:jS2j
3

. (S1) 
jS1j
3

. (S2)
2
< 0
Hence the contradiction. Therefore, for all S1; S2  V (G), disconnected:
C(S1)  C(S1 [ S2)) C(S2) > C(S1 [ S2)
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Let K  V , be a clique of size jKj = k in G. Given that no node or edge are
deleted when constructing G0, G is a subgraph of G0 and thus K is a clique in
G0 and . G0(K) =
 
k
3

.
Moreover, by construction, G0[V ] is a clique and for all u in K, the neighbors
of u are also in V . Therefore, each edge in K forms one triangle with each vertex
in V nK, which leads to . G0(K) =
 
k
2

(n  k). Finally, this gives a cohesion:
CG0(K) =
 
k
3
 
k
3

+
 
k
2

(n  k)
Conversely, let S  V 0 be a connected set of vertices such that CG0(S) 
(k3)
(k3)+(
k
2)(n k)
. We will show that S is a clique of size larger than k and that
S  V . First note that jSj  3, because by denition, if jSj < 3, CG0(S) = 0
which would lead to a contradiction.
First, suppose that S is not a clique in G, then let us distinguish two cases:
1. If S  V and S is not a clique, then S contains two vertices u; v 2 V 2
such that uv =2 E.
2. If S ( V , then 9u 2 S n V , and S being connected, there exists v 2 V 0
such that uv =2 E.
Therefore, if S is not a clique in G, it contains an edge uv =2 E and by construc-
tion, this edge belongs to at least 2
 
n
3
4
triangles, which leads to:
.
G0(S) +
.
G0(S)  2

n
3
4
CG0(S) 
.
G0(S)
2
2
 jSj
3
 
n
3
4
 1
2
 
n
3
2
<
 
k
3
 
k
3

+
 
k
2

(n  k)
Hence the contradiction, therefore S must be a clique in G. From there it comes
that:
CG0(S) =
 
k0
3
 
k0
3

+
 
k0
2

(n  k0)
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where k0 = jSj. Therefore:
CG0(S) 
 
k
3
 
k
3

+
 
k
2

(n  k) ,
 
k0
2

(n  k0) 
k0
3
   k2(n  k) 
k
3

, n  k
0
k0   2 
n  k
k   2
, k0  k
Therefore, we can now conclude that if there exists a connected set S in G0 with
cohesion CG0(S)  (
k
3)
(k3)+(
k
2)(n k)
, then S is a clique of size at least k in G, and
thus there exists a clique K  S of size k in G.
B Algorithms
B.1 Transform an instance of Clique into an instance of
Connected-Cohesive
Require: G = (V;E); k 2 N
W := ;
E0 := E
for uv 2 V 2 n E do
let K be a clique of size 2
 
n
3
4
W  W [K
E0  E0 [ fuvg [ (fu; vg K)
return G0 = (V [W;E0);  = (
k
3)
(k3)+(
k
2)(n k)
B.2 Valid Candidates
1: function isCandidate(S  V; u 2 V )
2: return false if u =2 N (S)
3: return false if u 2 S
4: return true if . (S) = 0 and . (S) < . (S [ fug)
5: return false if . (S) = . (S [ fug)
6: return true if C(S [ fug)  C(S)
7: return true if . (S [ fug)  jSj+1jSj 2 . (S)
8: return false
B.3 Communitize
1: function Communitize(S  V )
2: B  S
3: C  f u 2 V j isCandidate(S; u) g
4: for all u 2 C sorted as dened above do
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5: if u is not marked as visited then
6: mark u as visited
7: B0  Communitize(S [ fug)
8: if C(B)  C(B0) then
9: B  B0
return B
B.4 Update the Cohesion in place
function updateSet(S  V; u 2 V; )
.  . + . u
.  . +

.
u  . u

for all v 2 N (u) do
for all w 2 N (u) \N (v) do
if v 2 S then
.
w  . w +
.
w  . w  
else
.
w  . w +
B.5 Cover
function Cover(S  V )
C  ;
M  ;
for all u 2 S nM in increasing order of d(u) do
Cu  ;
for all v 2 N (u) nM do
M  M [Communitize(fu; vg)
if Cu = ; then
for all v 2 N (u) \M do
M  M [Communitize(fu; vg)
c element of Cu with maximum cohesion
C  C [ fcg
return C
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C Figures
.
u v
w1
wi
w2මn3ඹ
4
Figure 1: Illustration of Algorithm B.1. At this step, we join u and v, add a
clique of size 2
 
n
3
4
to the network, and join u and v to all vertices in the added
clique.
.
Figure 2: Those four cliques would not be found if only expanding aroung one
node, only the three encircled ones would.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the weights in Senate agreement graph for
six dierent Congresses.
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Figure 4: Evolution through time of the average agreement weight between
Senators.
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Figure 5: Evolution through time of the number of communities in the Senate
agreement graphs.
.
20 40 60 80 1000%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Congress Number
Figure 6: Evolution through time of the proportion of Senators remaining in
oce between two Congresses.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of the number of terms for each Senator.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of the values for community continuity be-
tween a community and its successor.
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of the co-presence ratio for pairs of Senators
present in at least one community together.
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Figure 10: Evolution through time of the average domination of the communities
by one political party.
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112th Congress
111th Congress
110th Congress
109th Congress
108th Congress
107th Congress
106th Congress
105th Congress
Republican DemocratIndependant
Figure 11: Political party breakdown of the communities of the Senate agree-
ment graph for the 8 last Congresses. Each path represent a Senator and the
color indicates the Political party they belong to. Each box is a community
and each row of boxes represent a particular Congress. Notice that the overlaps
between communities are visible here (e.g. where a Senator path forks into two
dierent communities).
INRIA
Finding cohesive communities with C3 25
D Tables
. < 0 .  0
. < 0
.
(n3)
.
. + .
 0 .
(n3)
 0
.  0 .
(n3)
 0 .
(n3)
.
. + .
 0
Table 1: Impact of signed triangles weights on the Cohesion.
105th Congress (1997{1999) 100 members
45 Democrat 55 Republican
1 Independant
106th Congress (1999{2001) 102 members
45 Democrat 56 Republican
1 Independant
1 Democrat
107th Congress (2001{2003) 101 members
49 Democrat 49 Republican
2 Independant 1 Democrat
1 Republican
108th Congress (2003{2005) 100 members
40 Democrat 51 Republican
1 Independant 18 Democrat
109th Congress (2005{2007) 101 members
44 Democrat 55 Republican
1 Independant 1 Democrat
110th Congress (2007{2009) 102 members
50 Democrat 41 Republican
1 Independant
11 Republican
111th Congress (2009{2011) 110 members
63 Democrat 35 Republican
1 Independant 6 Democrat
12 Republican
112th Congress (2011{2013) 101 members
51 Democrat 43 Republican
1 Independant
6 Republican
Table 2: Political party breakdown of the communities of the Senate agreement
graph for the 8 last Congresses.
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E Proles of 8 Republicans in a Democrat com-
munity
Charles Hagel was critic of the Bush Administration among other things over
the Iraq War, which in 2005 he compared to Vietnam. Furthermore, he has
repeatedly taken issue with the Bush Administration while in oce up to the
point of rating, in November 2007, the Bush administration \the lowest in ca-
pacity, in capability, in policy, in consensus almost every are" of any presidency
in the last forty years and adding in 2008 \I have to say this is one of the most
arrogant, incompetent administrations I've ever seen or ever read about.". Dur-
ing the 2008 Presidential Election, he also revealed he was open to running as
Vice-President with the Democrat nominee.
George Voinovich also had issues with the Bush Administration, in par-
ticular in terms on international politics and the Iraq War. In 2007 he did not
share President George W. Bush's optimism about the eectiveness of sending
more troops to Iraq. In 2008 he said at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee regarding the war in Iraq: \We've kind of bankrupted this
country" through war spending. \We're in a recession...and God knows how
long it's going to last.". Finally, Voinovich has been know to oppose lowering
taxes and frequently joined the Democrats on tax issues.
John Warner is a moderate Republic and has centrist stances on many
issues, to the point that he faced opposition of other members of its own party
when he decided to run for re-election for a fourth term in the Senate in 1996 {
he was a Senator from 1979 to 2009.
Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins are the two Republican Senators from
Main which are both reagarer to be leading moderates within their party, and
were described in 2009 as \nearly the last survivors of a once common species
of moderate Northeastern Republican".
John McCain was also described as a moderate although he began adopt-
ing more orthodox conservative views since his loss in the 2008 Presidential
Elecion { some analysis point his centre-right image as one of the reasons he
lost. Before 2008, it was said that while McCain usually tended towards con-
servative positions, he was not \anchored by the philosophical tenets of modern
American conservatism". He was also part of a group of senators which came
to be known as the Gang of 14 { of which Olympia Snowe, Susan Collins and
John Warner were also a part of { which had brokered a compromise in dicult
times between Republicans and Democrats during the previous Congress.
Gordon Smith is often described as politically moderate, although he also
has strong conservative credentials. He was placed in the exact ideological center
of the Senate by a 2006 National Journal congressional rating and he started
criticizing the Iraq War in 2006, after supporting it for four years, going as far
as saying that then current policy in Iraq \may even be criminal".
Norm Coleman had been a Democrat until he switched parties in Decem-
ber 1996, although still being considered one of the most liberal Republican in
the Senate. While running for mayor in 1993, he wrote in a letter to the City
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Convention Delegates in which he says: \I am a lifelong Democrat. [...] my
commitment to the great values of our party has remained solid.".
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